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A journalist asked me, isn’t this propaganda? I told him, propaganda 
for what?1
It is now no longer the taboo it once was to describe the September 11th attacks 
as spectacular. They were designed to do as much damage to America on a 
symbolic level as on the level of material destruction and death. It is also now 
widely accepted that as an act of spectacular terrorism, this was destined, if 
not deliberately planned, to be the first move in an enduring war of images. In 
this sense, it was, according to one especially daring Washington Post reporter, 
‘a masterpiece’.2 My subject here is not this symbolic manoeuvre itself, but the 
victims’ backlash. What agendas, constraints, tropes and modes of address 
characterized the visual representation of the attacks in the American media, and 
why? Has the United States’ position within the image war been strengthened 
or compromised by its response? What journalistic conventions were broken or 
adhered to in this process, and what were the implications? Lower Manhattan was 
filled with cameras on that day. Professional and amateur photographers in their 
thousands created a record more comprehensive than that of any other public 
event in history. And, this supply was equally met by demand. The following day’s 
newspapers were taken over by photography, with text largely relegated to margins 
and captions. Photo editors faced an unusual problem – instead of struggling 
to find the right pictures, they struggled to fit all the pictures in, in many cases 
responding by creating special editions and photographic supplements in which 
words could be dispensed with almost completely. Barbie Zelizer has argued that 
the American media’s photographic presentation of the attacks was ‘dazzling’, 
and that the sidelining of words that was associated with this had political 
consequences. Critical questions about what had led to the attacks, their possible 
prevention and the nature of the Bush administration’s immediate response 
and subsequent military action were deflected by means of a spectacular image 
overload.3 While the deliberate hiding of particular images from public view may 
1 SPeCtaCLe and 
CoLLeCtiVe memory
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indeed have been an issue, a more fundamental problem was the disabling of 
public critical engagement by an abundance of images that did not reveal the 
whole truth but seemed to satisfy by their sheer volume and impact. This dazzling 
effect operated on two levels. The first was the immediate photographic news 
coverage that took place in the days following the attacks: the high-pressure 
editorial decisions regarding what, and how much, to publish of the first visual 
details at the World Trade Center and Pentagon sites. This early stage could be 
called, in the pseudo-military terminology of an image war, defensive. Then, as 
well as documentation of the slower processes of recovery and response, later 
stages involved more calculated uses of photographic imagery for propaganda 
purposes: carefully orchestrated PR appearances by political figures at the site, for 
example, and perhaps most striking of all, the US Department of State’s touring 
photographic exhibition, After September 11: Images from Ground Zero.
Though television was the medium that first broke the news of the September 
11th attacks to American and international audiences, our subject here is the 
printed press.4 One reason for this focus is that, due to the dangers of close-range 
filming and the difficulties of transmission, most of the video coverage of Lower 
Manhattan that day was gathered by news teams positioned at high vantage 
points on buildings that were a safe distance away from the World Trade Center. 
This, and the unprecedented decision quickly made by news networks to share 
footage, means that most of the early moving images seen around the world were 
essentially the same wide-angle, long-range views, repeated over and over again. 
Still photography, on the other hand, provided much greater diversity and detail. 
The pictures that made it into the following day’s newspapers via the Associated 
Press, Reuters and other agencies not only framed the burning towers from a 
frontal, bird’s eye perspective but also from myriad positions on the streets below. 
Photographers were able to capture the unfolding human drama as well as the big 
picture, in some cases having to negotiate risks to their own safety and inhaling 
the same dust and smoke as their subjects. Further, in keeping with, but also 
somewhat crippled by, television’s special role as the medium best equipped to 
relay breaking news in real time, TV news networks were able to present only what 
their live cameras were taking in minute by minute, in many cases struggling to 
comprehend what they were seeing even as they were broadcasting it. The printed 
press, on the other hand, had at least a little time to make decisions about its 
picturing of the events.5
The appetite for printed news in America in the aftermath of September 
11th was so huge that before long, as well as reporting the unfolding story, 
newspaper editors realized that they themselves were becoming part of the story. 
This event called for unprecedented decisions to be made regarding editorial 
content, distribution and print volume. As the Los Angeles Times reported on 
13 September, at least 100 newspapers published ‘extra editions’ on the Tuesday 
afternoon, with front page headlines declaring, ‘TERROR’, ‘OUTRAGE’, ‘DAY 
9781472533319.indd   16 2/25/15   1:49 PM
SPeCtaCLe and CoLLeCtiVe memory      17
OF EVIL’ and ‘BASTARDS!’ in much larger-than-usual type.6 The same article 
reports that on Wednesday morning, the Los Angeles Times itself had printed 
180,000 more copies than usual, and 50,000 more by noon. The New York Times 
printed 450,000 extra on Wednesday, approximately doubling its usual print 
run, and spokesmen said there would be an expected 900,000 further copies on 
Thursday. TIME, America’s largest weekly news magazine, posted stories and 
pictures from a special 40-page ‘memorial’ edition on its website on Wednesday 
evening, expecting to publish seven million copies by the end of Thursday, and 
Newsweek also quickly produced two million copies of a 64-page special edition 
that contained no advertising.7 On its now famous ‘US attacked’ cover, the New 
York Times featured an extra-large typeface used only twice previously by the 
paper, for the first manned moon landing and the resignation of Richard Nixon. 
The Chicago Tribune (which initially increased its press run by 15 per cent and 
by Thursday had printed another 900,000 extra copies) remarked that the nation’s 
newspapers presented widely varying tones, or ‘more personality’ when compared 
to the relatively homogenous coverage provided by television news. This was, it 
said, ‘a reflection of papers’ traditional role as records not only of the moment, but 
historical markers destined to be keepsakes’.8
Despite this perceived diversity, however, a close look at how newspapers 
used photographs during these first few days reveals that the range of views 
represented is in fact very narrow. In her own survey of the attacks’ printed 
press coverage, Zelizer has identified four prevailing categories of photograph.9 
Three of these are photographs showing the towers’ ruins being observed by 
witnesses (usually uniformed rescue workers or other figures of authority), those 
showing witnesses watching as the attacks unfold, but not showing the scene 
itself (as in Figure I.1) and images of people looking at photographs or taking 
photographs. The first and most prominent category, however, consists of images 
of the World Trade Center towers themselves during or just after the impact of 
the second plane. Included in this category is Spencer Platt’s view shown in 
Figure 1.1, and the photograph taken by Steve Ludlum that appeared on the 
front page of the New York Times the following day. Ludlum’s picture provides a 
wide-angle view showing the intact Brooklyn Bridge in the foreground and the 
exploding twin towers surrounded by the other (as yet) undamaged buildings 
of the financial district. John Loengard, former director of photography at 
LIFE magazine, offers his opinion of why this image was chosen for the Times 
front page, saying that it ‘put the event in a context – human habitation, the 
size of the city – whereas many of the others were focussed directly on the 
towers’.10 It is perhaps significant that the paper chose to lead with a photograph 
in which the scale of the catastrophe is clear but is set within a larger context 
of relative normality. This is in contrast to TIME magazine’s commemorative 
cover, featuring a photograph by Lyle Oweko that shows the exploding towers 
in dramatic foreshortened isolation, evoking not steadfastness, but epic, almost 
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figure 1.1 Hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 crashes into the South Tower of 
the World Trade Center 9.03 a.m. September 11th 2001. Photo by Spencer Platt, 
Getty Images.
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cinematic destruction. These and other views of the towers were by far the most 
common choice for the front pages of papers around the country, and they 
continued to appear long after the rubble was cleared. The New York Times, 
whose front page featured not one, but five photographs of varying sizes, has 
become invested with historical meaning as a commemorative object in itself, 
as the Chicago Tribune predicted many papers would. The context of the action 
shown in Ludlum’s dominant image is illustrated by four supplementary views: 
United Airlines Flight 175 before impact with the south tower (forming a kind 
of inverted ‘before and after’), firefighters in the towers’ wreckage, the scene of 
the Pentagon attack and a wounded female victim receiving first aid near the 
World Trade Center site – a relatively graphic illustration of actual bodily injury 
that proved very rare in the American press from this point onwards.
Another unconventional photojournalistic trope, and one that is associated 
with Zelizer’s category of pictures that show people looking at pictures, is 
pictures of people looking at screens.11 Appearing frequently in newspapers 
far beyond New York and Washington are a notable number of photographs of 
people looking at footage of the attacks on screens, often in public places and 
in groups (Figure  1.2). Further illustrating the nationwide and international 
impact of the event, it is again not the attack itself that is the ‘news’ signified 
by these images, but the act of watching, particularly when this watching is a 
collective activity and one that marks an exception to people’s usual habits of 
news consumption. Photographs of photographs and photographs of screens 
all involve a layering of refracted gazes, each layer redoubling the burden of 
spectacle. So heavy was this burden – the imperative not only to bear witness to 
the devastation of the buildings but to the devastation of other witnesses – that 
it seemed to create the need for a further category, in which figures of authority 
appear in the frame looking along with us and on our behalf. From around 15 
September, photographs and footage began to appear of political leaders arriving 
to observe for themselves the scene in Lower Manhattan. The New York Times 
ran a large picture of President Bush and other officials at Ground Zero with 
the caption, ‘President Bush surveyed what looked like a war zone yesterday 
at the World Trade Center site. Representative Jerold Nadler, Governor Pataki 
and Mayor Giuliani accompanied him.’12 The authority of these witnesses can 
be seen, Zelizer says, as a symbolic invitation, providing a prompt for viewers 
in their own reactions. These pictures are used, again, not only because of their 
inherent newsworthiness, but as representative signals of appropriate response. 
She identifies this particular convention as beginning with the photographic 
coverage of the liberation of Nazi death camps in 1945, when General Eisenhower 
and other Allied leaders were brought to the camps to be photographed looking, 
along with the rest of the world, at the horrors that had been uncovered there.13 
This, she argues, was for international audiences a historical moment of such 
disorientating atrocity that it essentially called for a demonstration of how to 
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see. In this moment, looking was so serious an undertaking that it had to be 
modelled and led by society’s chief witnesses. Of all the post–September 11th 
photographs consistent with this function, the one shown in Figure 1.3 was 
the most widely circulated. Mark McKinnon, George W. Bush’s media advisor, 
somewhat optimistically describes the picture of the president atop the ‘pile’ at 
Ground Zero with retired firefighter Bob Beckwith as ‘the most lasting and iconic 
image of [his] presidency. It is much like President Reagan’s call in Berlin to “tear 
down this wall,” except this moment was unscripted and an antecedent to war, 
which makes it even more powerful.’14 Other political and media figures disagree 
on the point of the image’s spontaneity, but not on its value to the president’s 
P.R. The photo opportunity was not only perfectly realized, but essential, says 
Luc Sante, cultural critic and historian of photography: ‘People wanted to see 
him climbing on top of something [down there] … Even if the calculation was 
done five minutes ahead of time, it was calculated. I’m positive of it. [It was] 
part of an image-management strategy that’s characterised this administration 
from the beginning.’15 And, there can be no doubt that it is, for these purposes, 
a perfect photograph. The president stands as the uppermost figure in the scene 
and is the sole focus of the crowd, whom he addresses through a loud haler. 
But, his body language self-consciously shifts attention on to Beckwith, who by 
contrast stands, feet planted wide apart, hands on hips and gaze aloft, as the real 
hero of the moment. This status is reinforced by his age (seventy-nine) and also 
by the gas-mask-like apparatus worn around his neck, both of which implicitly 
identify him with the ‘greatest generation’ and lend this moment something of 
the glory attributed to America’s involvement in the Second World War. But, 
instead of a uniform, Beckwith is dressed in the scruffy jeans and sweatshirt of 
the American everyman, and so he is also an archetype of the civilian heroism 
that has already come to characterize this episode in New York’s history. Bush 
picks out this American hero, elevates him for all to see and then stands reflected 
in his eminence, identifying himself as the champion of all that Beckwith 
represents. But, in case the symbol of a hero who is part civilian and part officer 
is too ambiguous (Beckwith is not just a firefighter, he is a ‘veteran’ firefighter), 
the group is flanked in the foreground by a uniformed FDNY official on the left 
and a police officer on the right, both mirroring one another’s solemn pose and 
facial expression and adding further emphasis to the gravitas of the moment.
Alongside the repetitive scenes of rubble, smoke, rescue workers, heroes 
and watchers, though, there was an overwhelming absence. In the thousands 
of photographs that circulated within the public sphere in the week following 
the attacks, death was everywhere implied, but invisible. The closest that 
most newspaper editors came to showing dead bodies was in the ‘jumper’ 
photographs. Images of falling victims – a sight that for many eyewitnesses was 
the defining horror of the day – appeared in a handful of papers around the 
country within twenty-four hours of the attacks but then quickly disappeared 
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from view. Their place was taken by symbols: architectural destruction without 
any visible trace of the people inside; the streets of Lower Manhattan covered 
with ad-hoc memorial paraphernalia, crosses and photographs of missing 
victims; tokens of the invisible dead. A very rare exception, appearing in the 
Los Angeles Times on 14 September, was a large photograph of rescue workers 
holding a body bag on a stretcher above their heads. The caption reads: ‘A victim 
of the WTC disaster is carried out of the rubble in a body bag, one of 30,000 
ordered by city officials as the grim collection of corpses continues.’ But the body 
itself is not visible.16
A New York Times article on 13 September discussed the dilemma faced by 
pictures’ desks in those chaotic days, regarding what to publish and what to 
shield from public view. It observed that ‘not since the Oklahoma bombing or 
the crash of a helicopter in Mogadishu, Somalia, have newspaper editors and 
television producers had so many images available that show the graphic deaths 
and dismemberments of Americans’.17 But, several factors were at play in the 
editorial decisions that had to be made about these pictures. Some, like Erik 
Sorenson, president and general manager of MSNBC, asked the question, ‘when 
does realistic coverage of a tragedy cross the line into exploitation?’ arguing that 
‘there were plenty of images that told the story without all of the gore’.18 In the 
same article, David Westin, president of ABC News, put it a different way: ‘the 
question is, are we informing or titillating and causing unnecessary grief? Our 
responsibility is to inform the American public of what’s going on and, in going 
the next step, is it necessary to show people plunging to their death?’19 Conversely, 
Ed Kosner, editor in chief of New York Daily News, who had caused controversy in 
the first few days with his decision to print a photo of a severed hand, argued, ‘you 
can’t do the story without doing the story. It’s no time to be squeamish’.20
Commonly accepted standards of taste are the most obvious explanation for 
the invisibility of human destruction in this instance. There would arguably have 
been little point in causing further distress at such a delicate time, particularly 
given the very real risk of family members recognizing the remains of loved ones, 
perhaps even before being notified of their deaths. The convention of picturing 
architectural wreckage or other signifiers such as lighted candles, blood splatters, 
strewn items of clothing and personal effects rather than human remains ensures 
impact without distaste. In the British and American press, unlike that of other 
parts of the world, it is usual practice to picture a scene of death only after the 
bodies are out of sight. Most of the horror of these images lies in imagining 
either what has gone before or what is outside the frame. These images can be 
metaphorical or even beautiful, suiting a sombre mood rather than illustrating 
the full impact of ‘reality’. This practice could be called euphemistic, implying 
manipulation or dishonesty, and yet it is sometimes difficult to discern between 
the dishonest and the considerate. It is also difficult to discern between common 
decency in the face of grief and manipulation for questionable political ends. That 
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is what makes any detached critical study of this subject both very important and 
very sensitive. This fine line was negotiated by newsrooms and press offices all 
over the world in the aftermath of September 11th. In an article titled ‘Brokering 
the Power of the Image’, James Kelly, managing editor of TIME magazine, reflects 
on his publication’s history in recording the horrors of war, claiming that ‘times 
have changed’ since the days when official censorship was what made war 
fatalities invisible. He discusses the ethical wrestling involved in deciding what 
to show and what to hold back, and his comments reveal his adherence to the 
American mainstream press convention of occasionally printing photographs 
of dead foreigners, but almost never Americans, and certainly never white 
Americans:
It is also undeniable that the task of deciding what photos to run in TIME has 
grown much more difficult in the wake of September 11th. In putting together 
our special issue on the World Trade Center attacks, I considered whether 
we should use photographs of the many victims who jumped out of windows 
rather than stay behind and be burned to death … I’m not saying that one 
decision is right and the other wrong but only that my sensibility led me to 
pick one over the other.21
Kelly’s comments highlight two points. First, that September 11th changed 
photojournalism, and second, the issue of exactly what it is that prompts the 
decision to print or hide a dead body. For Kelly, it was ‘sensibility’. For others, the 
criteria may have been different.
Zelizer identifies an uncritical acceptance of invisibility in the aftermath of 
September 11th, suggesting that American society has been complacent about 
‘seeing less when we should see more’.22 The main reason for this, she says, is that 
so little information was made to look like so much, and that the images shown 
were generally not complex or multi-layered, but easily readable and easily 
slotted into the pervading interpretive schema. The ubiquity of such images, 
which Zelizer calls ‘pure surfaces’, created the illusion of masses of information 
and infinite visibility, when in fact these huge numbers of photographs were all 
variations on the same narrow set of themes. Which images were being pushed 
aside in this deluge? Is it simply the invisibility of bodies and gore that is at issue 
here? How dangerous or destructive could this invisibility really be? John Taylor, 
in his book Body Horror, equates the absence of horror in the representation of 
real events, however sensitive, with a ‘dangerous poverty of knowledge’.23 He 
concludes that if the press has a responsibility to show horror more graphically 
than it does, this is because of the importance of bearing witness; a debt owed 
to the dead or suffering to ensure that society learns something and that such 
a thing cannot happen again. Bearing witness, he argues, is an act of cultivating 
historical memory: an appropriate sense of things as they happened. The 
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responsibility of the media is to mark out and present events with honesty, and 
the decision not to show unpleasant details robs the public of the opportunity 
to bear witness.24 Taylor seems to be suggesting that the press should be 
responsible for the deliberate shaping of public memory and for creating a space 
within which people can appropriately witness, as well as for deciding what is 
appropriate. The potential for ideological influence seems to lie, for him, in the 
decision to hide particular pictures. For Susan Sontag, on the other hand, any 
kind of deliberately cultivated ‘public’ or ‘collective memory’ at all, whether or 
not it is graphic in its presentation of horror, constitutes a dangerous ideology, 
and this is an inevitable outcome whenever institutions assume control of sets 
of images:
All memory is individual, unreproducible – it dies with each person. What is 
called collective memory is not a remembering but a stipulating: that this is 
important, and this is the story about how it happened, with the pictures that 
lock the story in our minds. Ideologies create substantiating archives of images, 
representative images, which encapsulate common ideas of significance and 
trigger predictable thoughts [and] feelings.25
It is tempting to make generalizations about the political and social factors 
at play in the control of the visual representation of September 11th. Why, 
from the state’s point of view, was it not in the national interest to see the 
bodies of victims of September 11th? Wouldn’t the heightened outrage have 
cemented support for retaliation? The ideological motivations and power of 
the Bush administration were surely implicated, as was the media’s compulsion 
to cooperate with them, particularly as the days and weeks went by and the 
transition was made from initial knee-jerk reportage to a period of ‘making 
sense’, followed by commemoration. It would also be easy to overstate the 
passivity of the audience at whom this representation was aimed, within and 
outside the United States. It is on this point that Theodor Adorno’s critique of 
‘the culture industry’ presents a useful model. For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
the culture industry is constituted by the complex and often fluid relationship 
between ruling ideology, mass media and society and is characterized by 
the direct control of populations through the manipulation of their desires. 
This seems to be an ideal framework for the analysis of American culture at 
this time, when the political administration had such a vested interest in the 
emotional state of the nation, and the threatened population in turn looked 
to both government and media for reassurance with an urgency rarely seen 
before or since. There is a proviso, however, that in his writing on this subject, 
Adorno can be accused of a certain amount of generalization when it comes 
to the definitions of the ‘ruling ideology’. Those referred to in his work ‘The 
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ as ‘the people at the 
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top’, who possess a ‘violent monopoly over cultural life’, are never identified 
in very specific detail.26 In common with his contemporaries within the 
Frankfurt School, an underlying motivation for much of Adorno’s work was 
to understand the roots of fascism: what the workings of the culture industry 
might reveal about this extreme ideology, and how such an ideology could 
possibly have taken hold of a civilized society in the way that it did in 1930s’ 
Europe.27 While by no means analogous, early twenty-first-century America 
was also a society gripped by uncertainty, suspicion and conflict, in which what 
might be called the ‘visual culture industry’ had a relationship to dominant 
socio-political forces that warrants a similar kind of attention. Another proviso, 
however, is that along with the wider Frankfurt School at the point of their 
writing, Adorno and Horkheimer’s concern with culture and subjectivity in 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment (in which Adorno’s ‘Culture Industry’ essay 
appears) is somewhat detached from the concrete politics of the day, and in 
particular from the very pragmatic Marxist base/superstructure model which 
lay at the original foundation of much of their work. One consequence of this 
is a degree of fatalism. Unlike Marx’s, Adorno’s critique is not connected to any 
constructive means of redressing the manipulation or deception in which the 
masses are caught.
A central argument of ‘The Culture Industry’ concerns the use of popular 
media to disable individuals’ capacity for critical reflection through what 
might be summed up as a kind of mass-produced distraction,28 which Adorno 
goes as far as to describe as ‘psychoanalysis in reverse’.29 In his words, ‘the 
need which might resist central control has already been suppressed by the 
control of the individual consciousness.’30 The key point here is that the culture 
industry has power over individual consciousness not by overcoming diversity 
of thought through aggressive ideological control or forceful domination, but 
by managing in the first place to create a situation in which each ‘individual’ 
– reproduced as a subject of mass consumption – is essentially alike. This
homogenization of individual consciousness also creates in each subject
an appetite for more of the same control: ‘freedom to choose an ideology –
since ideology always reflects economic coercion – everywhere proves to be
freedom to choose what is always the same’.31 All possible modes of thought
and consumption are freely permitted in what is ostensibly a liberal society,
but the desires of the population are, Adorno argues, subtly, actively and pre-
emptively shaped so that the culture industry is then in turn only ‘giving the
people what they want’.
This is perhaps the kind of dynamic that is at play when James Kelly of 
TIME magazine says that in the question of how to represent the aftermath of 
the September 11th attacks, he was not influenced by official censorship but was 
instead left to the freedom of his own liberal ‘sensibility’, which led him, as it 
did countless other editors, to conform to a pattern that aligned with prevailing 
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political convention and intent. In a liberal media environment such as this, as well 
as communicating visual information, photojournalism also functions precisely 
to serve the expectations of its audience. It tends to confirm existing ideas rather 
than introducing new ones and, in a manner that fits precisely with the Adornian 
model of manipulating individual subjects by ‘giving them what they want’ within 
a totalizing framework, reinforces rather than challenges existing beliefs. In other 
words, news is always presented in relation to things already known. This goes 
some way towards explaining why the range of photographs was in this instance 
so narrow, with so little deviation.
There are numerous examples of this kind of reductive logic being played 
out photographically. One of the most prominent, which lent itself more readily 
to verbal than visual rhetoric, but was also represented in photographs, was 
the basic narrative trope of a battle between good and evil. The righteous and 
morally superior position of the United States was reinforced in images of 
political leaders, who by means of various gestures and photo opportunities 
could be seen to step up and offer assurance of retribution. Headlines such as 
‘President promises to avenge lost lives’ and ‘Bush vows to respond and calls 
for calm’ were combined with photographs like the one featured in the Los 
Angeles Times on 12 September, of President Bush on the telephone to Vice 
President Dick Cheney aboard Air Force One, looking capable and determined 
(Figure  1.4).32 Other images in support of this same rhetorical message also 
featured in the Los Angeles Times on this date, including one of Bush later in the 
day, disembarking Air Force One at St. Andrews Air Force Base and addressing 
the nation from the Oval Office. A photograph of an F-16 fighter en route to 
Washington, DC, also served to convey the image of a president in control.33 In 
his wide-ranging chronicle of the stories behind many of the most well-known 
September 11th photographs, David Friend suggests that the Air Force One 
picture was deliberately distributed by the administration to counteract the 
effect of the earlier photographs and footage of the president at the Florida 
school where he first learned of the attacks, in which he appears confused, 
passive and awkward.34 Ari Fleischer, Bush’s then press secretary, explains the 
effects of the later image:
On September 11 and the immediate aftermath, the nation did see – whether 
it was live on TV for extended periods of time or in the snapshot of a 
photo – a very determined, strong president. That picture caught it. That’s one 
of the reasons that picture resounded so well with the public.35
As well as boosting the president’s public image, another function of this 
photograph (also served by the pictures of fighter planes) was to associate the 
September 11th attacks immediately with war. Bush’s declarations to this effect 
were repeated in many headlines, and the connection extended in some reports to 
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include the inference that rescue workers at Ground Zero were fulfilling a kind of 
military duty. At least one article described the firefighters as serving on a ‘front 
line’ and went on to say that, on the occasion of Bush’s visit captured by Eric Draper 
in Figure 1.3, they were ‘happy to see the Commander in Chief ’.36 The framing of 
the attacks as an act of war, however, and of the president as a resolute commander 
preparing to retaliate, was complicated by a simultaneous imperative to convey the 
opposite image, of emotional sensitivity. This paradox was illustrated by a pair of 
photographs printed in the New York Times on 12 September. One showed a large 
close-up of Bush in front of the US flag, hands clasped, his expression concerned 
and reflective, appearing to respond to the situation primarily on the level of 
its emotional impact. Directly beside this was a smaller photograph of Donald 
Rumsfeld speaking at the Pentagon. His fist is clenched and raised in a direct, 
aggressive attitude that contrasts sharply with that of Bush, and the appearance 
of these images side by side seems to represent a careful balancing act, the two 
leaders adopting opposite roles that could never have been enacted simultaneously 
by just one figure.37
The open emotion of Bush’s demeanour in the days following the attacks was 
also captured in a famous photograph taken at the Oval Office immediately after 
his announcement on the telephone to Rudy Giuliani and George Pataki that he 
had decided to go to New York and visit Ground Zero for himself. The picture, 
taken by Kevin Lamarque, is a very tightly cropped close-up of the president’s 
face, his mouth strained and eyes glistening with tears. Fleischer, again, expresses 
satisfaction at this photo opportunity well taken: ‘he started to cry at the end of the 
call. In the classic way that Bush men do, he started to tear up. And there are some 
wonderful photographs that captured that tear. The press was in the Oval Office 
for it.’38 Not everyone saw it as wonderful though. When the picture appeared 
on the front page of the British Times, its caption emphasized further the inner 
conflict that is visible in the president’s face: ‘tears well in the eyes of President 
Bush as he speaks of families and victims during an Oval Office press conference. 
He said: “I’m a loving guy, and I’m also someone, however, who has a job to do 
and I intend to do it.” ’39 Los Angeles Times television critic Howard Rosenberg 
compared Bush’s screen presence during his much-criticized first televised speech 
to the nation with that of previous presidents Reagan and Clinton: ‘throughout 
this terrible week in US history, Bush has lacked size in front of the camera when 
he should have been commanding and filling the screen.’ Rosenberg picked 
up in particular on the president’s body language (‘slinking guiltily’), noting 
that he appeared like ‘a little boy’; genuinely moved, but not strong. ‘These are 
times when America needs a president they can look up to’, he concluded, ‘not 
just one who will share in their mourning.’40 In the Chicago Tribune, another 
reporter described the national White House address as ‘thuddingly rote’ and 
complained, ‘he had the sentiments right, but this president seems unable to rub 
sticks together to light a rhetorical fire’.41 In moments like these, George W. Bush 
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did not make his press officers’ job any easier. But nonetheless, the New York 
Times recorded a significant increase in support for the president during this 
period. ‘Few challenged the national leadership at the time’, it reported, ‘and one 
late-night television talk show host who questioned the notion that the airplane 
hijackers were “cowards” was shunned by sponsors, and rebuked by the White 
House spokesman.’42
While images of the president and other political leaders served to enact the 
simple narrative themes of war and of goodness in the face of evil, pictures of 
ordinary citizens present at the scene of the attacks upheld and developed these. 
The principal figure in this process, depicted in countless photographs and in the 
texts around them, was the hero. Most strongly associated with firefighters, this title 
was also extended to rescue workers and other uniformed men, but it continued 
to proliferate as a rhetorical device that eventually came to encompass victims 
and survivors. Within the mainstream photographic record, images denoting 
rescue, help and kindness dominated. Crying or injured people were rarely shown 
alone, and signs of panic were typically counterbalanced by some positive gesture 
such as an embrace or an act of practical assistance.43 Particularly prevalent were 
photographs of uniformed men coming to the aid of civilian women (Figure 1.5), 
and strong, physically able people bodily propping up those weakened by shock or 
injury. It is unsurprising that there should have been so many photographs of this 
kind: many remarkable rescues and small acts of kindness took place that day in 
view of the many hundreds of cameras present, and a large number of people could 
no doubt rightly be commended for extraordinary courage and selflessness. But, 
the extensive use of the word ‘hero’, the proliferation of photographs like Jennifer 
Altman’s and the almost total absence of any image of untempered distress or 
untended suffering created in the media an impression of ubiquitous, self-evident, 
almost transcendental heroism.44 In his introduction to LIFE magazine’s anthology 
of their coverage of the event, former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani takes 
the final rhetorical step of ascribing it to all of the victims:
Even more devastating is the loss of thousands of individuals who were killed 
in the attack. All were innocent. All were heroes. Those who went to work in 
the World Trade Center on September 11 were engaged in the quiet heroism 
of supporting their families, pursuing their dreams, and playing their own 
meaningful part in a diverse, dynamic and free society.45
Among those prepared to question this widespread heroizing was Jürgen 
Habermas. ‘Perhaps the word has different connotations in American English 
than it does in German’, he mused a few weeks after the attacks. ‘It seems to 
me that whenever “heroes” are honoured the question arises as to who needs 
them and why. Even in this looser sense of the term one can understand Bertolt 
Brecht’s warning: “Pity the land that needs heroes.” ’46 Habermas suggests that 
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figure 1.5 Woman rescued by emergency personnel after World Trade Center 
terrorist attack. Photo by Jennifer S. Altman, WireImage/Getty Images.
9781472533319.indd   31 2/25/15   1:49 PM
32      PhotograPhy and SePtember 11th
when the term is used, as it is by Giuliani, to refer to the normal pursuits of 
work and family life, it is not because such acts are actually heroic, but because 
the need to delineate the binary of good and evil, of villain and hero, is so great. 
The ‘land needed heroes’ at such a senseless time, because it needed a story that 
made sense.
In some cases, this impulse became explicitly attached to particular 
photographs, like that of firefighter Mike Kehoe. The famous photograph, taken 
by John Labriola, of Kehoe looking fleetingly into the camera as he ascends the 
stairwell of the North Tower while most of its occupants are escaping in the 
other direction cast him not only as a hero, but a celebrity. ‘Everyone wanted a 
piece of him’, wrote Jodie Morse of TIME magazine. ‘There were 40 messages a 
day from reporters … One particularly aggressive fan … wrote almost daily on 
stationary with pink hearts and drove all the way to New York City … just to see 
him in the flesh.’47 Going on to receive a ‘Pride of Britain’ award and appearing in 
TIME magazine’s ‘Person of the Year’ issue, Kehoe was reportedly bemused and 
distressed at being honoured in this way when so many of his colleagues had been 
killed. ‘Kehoe had not perished’, writes David Friend,
nor had he saved a single life on September 11. But this slight-of-build son and 
brother of a fire fighter seemed to personify his profession. Unlike hundreds 
of firemen who were not caught on film that morning … Kehoe was the one 
who had walked into the lens as if he were minutes from staring death itself 
in the face. As such, Kehoe became an inadvertent icon, The Fireman in the 
Stairwell.48
The almost hysterical reaction of admirers, politicians and the media to this 
‘inadvertent’ symbol illustrates the need, pointed out by Habermas, for heroes, 
their stories, their images and ideally their happy endings. It also illustrates the 
unpredictable power of the camera to shape people’s destinies. Kehoe, by his 
own admission, was cast as the hero not because he did anything remarkable, or 
even because he survived, but because he happened to be the one caught by the 
camera.
The distinct but interrelated tropes of good and evil, hero and villain, military 
honour and leaders who could both empathize and avenge were slotted by the 
media into pre-existing narrative templates that readers could easily grasp 
because they were reassuringly familiar. While the unprecedented nature of 
the attacks and their horrifying originality were evident, journalists and editors 
responded by emphasizing, through the selection and arrangement of images and 
the choice of words, how they could be related to reference points from history – 
like the attack on Pearl Harbor – or to the fictional plotlines of action movies.49 
This formula, in which events are presented as conforming to what viewers 
and readers apparently already know, thus confirming their existing matrix of 
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beliefs about the world, often follows catastrophic news events. In John Taylor’s 
words, it necessarily ‘arise[s] from the sudden collapse of generally reliable 
systems’, when the known has been undermined.50 The first question asked in 
the aftermath of such an event is ‘why?’, and so, attempts are made early on to 
impose meaning upon the senselessness. In this case, the restoration of order 
was enacted in various ways, from the reassuring rhetoric of justice triumphing 
over evil, to a highlighting of the ways in which particular photographs revealed 
formal and ideological echoes of images from the past (most famously Thomas 
Franklin’s picture of firefighters raising the flag at Ground Zero with Joe 
Rosenthal’s World War Two Iwo Jima icon). Another means of reconstructing 
‘reliable systems’ was in the use of computer-generated schematic diagrams, or 
info-graphics. Every major American newspaper featured at least one image of 
this kind within the first week or so: a clean-lined, sanitized graphic account 
of the towers’ structural damage and collapse, often incorporating a timeline 
of some kind and giving the impression of a sequence of events that is ordered 
and clearly apprehensible, with a beginning, a middle and an end.51
Having been established, these codes of visual and verbal rhetoric were 
repeated again and again. Such repetition in the news media of footage and 
photographs of disasters after their immediate occurrence is not usual. Rather 
than moving on from ‘yesterday’s news’, papers and magazines were dominated by 
spectacular photographs of the towers’ destruction for weeks, just as the television 
news sequences had shown the same footage (most commonly the impact of the 
second plane), on a loop for days. In the next chapter, I will explore the possibility 
that this repetition caused harm, but Daniel Sherman and Terry Nardin have 
suggested that it was also implicated in the projection of safety and the restoration 
of order. The repetition of these images, they argue, reinstated the kind of ‘safe 
spectatorship’ that typically characterizes Americans’ viewing position in relation 
to images of atrocity.52 In short, the images are repeated so many times that 
they become familiar and are simultaneously consigned to a position of more 
comfortable distance. Similar to the effect of orderly, tidy and clear schematic 
diagrams, Sherman and Nardin seem to argue that the device of repetition was 
used deliberately to lull viewers into a reassuring but false sense of knowledge 
and control.
As I will later argue, this is questionable. A much clearer consequence of the 
images’ repetition was simply to compound the image overload that broadly 
characterized the attacks’ aftermath. In a formula that corresponds to the culture 
industry model set out and condemned by Adorno, this overload was not only 
spectacular, but simplistically homogenized, and it not only suppressed critical 
reflection and debate, particularly regarding the war in Iraq, but also perpetuated 
desire for further manipulation by further dazzling, homogenized means. Like 
(or as) the products of the culture industry, this image spectacle ‘impede[d] 
the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and 
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decide consciously for themselves’.53 In ‘The Fetish Character in Music and the 
Regression of Listening’, Adorno uses the example of popular music to explain 
the process of ‘regression’ imposed upon audiences by the culture industry. 
Subjects are, he says, ‘arrested at the infantile stage’ by the homogenization, 
standardization and fetishization of music. This is not just a dismissive insult to 
listeners of popular music (whom Adorno believes to be idiots, albeit blameless 
ones), but rather a judgement of the system in which such listeners are hopelessly 
caught: ‘their primitivism is not that of the undeveloped’, he says, ‘but that of 
the forcibly retarded.’54 There was, I would argue, a similar kind of manipulative 
‘infantilization’ at work on the part of the visual culture industry, and specifically 
the news media, in the aftermath of September 11th. It is difficult to deny that the 
spectacular image bombardment that followed the event was shaped to appeal to 
viewers’ emotions rather than to critical thinking. The message conveyed was – 
rightly, up to a point – one of commemoration, focussing on loss and appealing 
in various ways to abstracted ideals such as the American spirit. Like Adorno’s 
‘regressive listening’, enforced ‘regressive seeing’ or naïveté in this respect was also 
facilitated by the promotion of fear, and when these respective messages had been 
established and driven home through persistent repetition, it was merely the next 
logical step to present revenge as a foregone conclusion.55
In Afflicted Powers, their study of the political forces at work in post–September 
11th America, four members of the San Francisco-based Retort collective (Iain 
Boal, T.J. Clark, Joseph Matthews and Michael Watts) use the ideas of Guy 
Debord and the Situationists concerning ‘the colonization of everyday life’, and 
‘the society of the spectacle’ to account for the problems that they see around 
them, summed up as social control and disintegration. They also argue that 
the matter of ‘mastery in the realm of the image’ has not been taken seriously 
enough in considering the political fallout of September 11th.56 Guy Debord 
intended his notion of spectacle to be considered as a new form of, or stage 
in, the accumulation of capital. For him, this meant the reduction of more and 
more aspects of human life to the level of the market, and while this was initially 
understood not to be dependent upon any one mode of representation, it soon 
became associated above all with the dissemination of images and appearances. 
The ‘colonization of everyday life’, meanwhile, suggested the exertion of control 
over the realm of individual privacy by the dominant culture industry. The goal 
of Debord’s analysis was to try to formulate resistance against these colonizing 
powers – a goal that somehow seemed possible in the 1960s. Debord was himself 
primarily concerned with the bearing that this rule of appearances had on 
politics, specifically state formation and surveillance. In their book, the Retort 
group revisits Debord’s spectacle, stressing that it does not only, as it has come to 
be misread, refer to disembodied representations, but specifically to the ‘exertion 
of social power’.57 To quote Debord himself, writing in 1967:
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The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship 
between people that is mediated by images. The spectacle cannot be understood 
either as a deliberate distortion of the visual world or as a product of the 
technology of the mass dissemination of images. It is far better viewed as a 
weltanschauung that has been actualised, translated into the material realm – a 
world view transformed into an objective force.58
Retort conclude from this that America is a ‘spectacular state’ – one in which 
capital, as Debord forewarned, has accumulated so vastly that it has itself become 
an image.59 This is the premise that explains the true implications of the September 
11th attacks: the stakes of the ‘image-war’, America’s actions and reactions in its 
wake and the bankruptcy of its rationale for actual war:
[We are experiencing in the United States] a monstrous political deployment 
of (and entrapment in) the apparatus of a modern, not to say hyper-modern, 
production of appearances. Interests and imagery collide … Mistakes or 
overreach in the management of the image-world have immediate political 
consequences … and outright defeat in the war of images is something no 
present-day hegemon can tolerate.60
The state’s deeper and deeper involvement in this internal culture industry means 
that it has come to ‘live or die by its investment in, and control of, the field of 
images’, now more than ever before.61 If America is fundamentally a spectacular 
state, then its response – not only in terms of its subsequent foreign policy (which 
Retort has scrutinized), but first, and even more fundamentally, in the September 
11th attacks’ representation by its visual culture industry – can also be called a 
dazzling mobilization of the spectacular: a world view transformed into an 
objective force. The overvisibility of certain controlled imagery combined with the 
invisibility of other views served to deflect public attention onto the sentimental, 
the redemptive, the aesthetic, the dramatic and the sublime, with the overall effect 
of disarming genuine political engagement.62 This is a bold claim to make, but it 
has its historical precedents; one of which is the American press coverage of the 
1991 Gulf War. Elaine Scarry has identified this episode as a case of the deliberate 
critical disempowerment of the American people by means of the news media. In 
the process leading up to this conflict, neither of the constitutional requirements 
for war – a formal declaration of war and the consultation of the population – 
was met.63 Because the president effectively acted alone, the people’s authority, and 
therefore their responsibility to other populations, was forfeited, and civic power 
lost. Scarry details this sequence of events, explaining that it was made possible 
specifically by inviting the population to perform what she calls a ‘mimesis of 
deliberation’, meaning effectively that they were distracted. News audiences were 
encouraged, for example, to engage in debates about sideline issues of much lesser 
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importance including the personal affairs of political figures involved in directing 
the war and the focus tending towards more immediate, trivial or ‘exciting’ news 
content.64 It was unsurprising, Scarry says, that what followed was ‘a general 
inattention to political events’, whereby Americans became ‘inattentive to the 
grave subjects that are our actual responsibility to oversee’.65 ‘Inattention’ in this 
instance seemed to mean not a disregard for or disinterest in the military action 
itself, but in the difficult political questions regarding its justification, efficacy 
and consequences. By a process of paternalistic distraction, the Gulf War could 
continue to be ongoing front-page news, seemingly without these issues being 
addressed at all. Directly recalling Adorno’s terms, ‘the population’, Scarry says, 
was ‘infantilised and marginalized’.
One of the best the diversionary news stories of the Gulf War period was 
the imagery of the war itself. Dazzling, mesmerizing and most importantly, 
entertaining, the extraordinarily hi-tech video-game-like spectacle presented on 
the nightly news ensured that Americans watched in ‘fascinated immobility’, but 
actual loss of life was not part of the story. Debord warned that when this kind 
of diversionary spectacle becomes the news, populations lose both sight and 
ownership of political responsibility because ‘all that was once directly lived has 
become mere representation’.66 Seeming to offer a warning to post–September 
11th America six years in advance, Scarry concludes: ‘when the government 
commits itself to theatrical spectacle, the possibility of opposition disappears 
and dissent becomes impossible.’67 The suspension of critical engagement with 
issues of foreign policy, domestic human rights and war in early twenty-first-
century America was not a product of deflection or distraction towards more 
trivial issues (this would have been impossible), but of the overplaying, through 
photographs, of the in-built spectacle of the September 11th attack itself. 
The deflection of emphasis was towards an exclusively visual and emotional 
understanding of the event. ‘The problem’, in the words of Susan Sontag, ‘is not 
that people remember through photographs, but that they remember only the 
photographs’, and this inevitably ‘eclipses other forms of understanding, and 
remembering.’68
The same New York Times article that noted a sharp increase in support for the 
president in the aftermath of September 11th went on to report that, on October 
25th 2001, the House of Representatives and the Senate voted overwhelmingly 
to grant the government sweeping new powers to ‘root out terrorism’ with a 
bill that allowed immigrants to be held without charge and citizens’ privacy 
breached in unprecedented ways.69 The terrorists’ actions had enabled George 
W. Bush to unite the United States behind him, quieting questions about the 
legitimacy of his presidency, and to reinforce a political and military sensibility 
that claimed a moral obligation to police the world. Instead of reflection in the 
face of America’s vulnerability, the administration sought to turn all thoughts to 
revenge. Distress was channelled in support of political and military interests, 
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and a path was cleared for war. Putting it even more forcefully, the Retort 
group concludes that ‘unanswerable lies have succeeded in eliminating public 
opinion’.70 Again, they cite Debord:
once one controls the mechanism which operates the only form of social 
verification to be universally recognised, one can say what one likes … 
Spectacular power can similarly deny whatever it wishes to, once, or three times 
over, and change the subject: knowing full well there is no danger of riposte, in 
its own space or any other.71
Research into public opinion carried out during the Gulf War gives a clue as to 
why no riposte emerged to the denials or distractions surrounding that conflict. It 
seems that, presumably because the reality was so unpleasant or unsettling, many 
Americans were content to be mesmerized by the mysterious pictures.72 ‘Most 
people did not want to reason about the war’; John Taylor writes, ‘they wanted to 
be numbed, and have responsibility taken from them. Giving up on reason and 
embracing generalised national hopes and desires is central to patriotism; it helps 
war leaders to stir up enthusiasm in the population and disguises or dismisses 
the dangers.’73 The post–September 11th spectacle provided the US government 
with both a public distraction from the impending loss of life in Iraq, if not that 
which had already taken place at Ground Zero, and a cue for a huge, nationwide 
surge in patriotism. Michelle Fine wrote at that time of ‘the long reach of ideology 
bleeding into conscious and unconscious thought and talk. You can’t be in New 
York, New Jersey, the United States without hearing personal testimonies wrapped 
in thickly accepted nationalist discourse’.74 Implicit in this discourse was, it seems, 
a tacit un-questioning, just as the New York Times had reported the judgement 
faced by those who dared to question the choices of the president or the reasoning 
behind the attacks themselves. But, such questions, in public discourse at least, 
were not raised often, because they had already been so effectively choked by 
the deluge of simplifying photographs and rhetoric. Among the most seriously 
oversimplified concepts, as Jacques Derrida has pointed out, was terrorism itself. 
‘Politically speaking’, he noted in the very earliest days following the attacks, ‘the 
more slippery a concept, the easier it is to appropriate it opportunistically … the 
most powerful and destructive appropriation of terrorism is precisely its use as a 
self-evident concept by all the parties involved.’75
Perhaps the most direct and forceful intervention in the public’s interpretation 
of the September 11th attacks by the US government was After September 11: 
Images from Ground Zero; a touring exhibition of photographs presented by the 
US Department of State and Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, launched 
in February 2004. Twenty-two sets of prints by photographer Joel Meyerowitz 
toured 135 venues in sixty-four countries, including the Afghanistan National 
Art Gallery in Kabul. The photographs were selected by the Department of 
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State to show ‘the true human and physical dimensions’ of the attacks’ aftermath.76 
Meyerowitz’s work is the only existing photographic record of the Ground Zero 
clean-up site. Almost immediately after the collapse of the towers, the area was 
fenced off, classified as a crime scene and closed to all photographers, until, with 
sponsorship from the Museum of the State of New York, Meyerowitz succeeded 
in gaining access on 13 September. Already an award-winning photographer 
with a record of solo exhibitions at the Museum of Modern Art, the Art Institute 
of Chicago, the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, the Boston Museum 
of Fine Art and others outside the United States, Meyerowitz has been most 
celebrated as a photographer of street life and landscapes, and for his early 
pioneering use of colour in both genres. History will likely show, however, that 
the Ground Zero archive is the work for which he will be most remembered by 
the American public.
He introduces Aftermath, the publication that followed this project, by 
saying, ‘I saw what I needed to do. To me, no photographs meant no history. I 
decided at that moment that I would find my way in and make an archive for 
the City of New York.’77 Clearly understanding his task in terms of national 
record and commemoration, Meyerowitz describes himself as being influenced 
by the state-commissioned documentary photographers of the Farm Security 
Administration in the 1920s, which was both nationally significant and ‘socially 
useful’.78 True to this intention, his huge archive of Ground Zero images is now 
a freely accessible digital resource held at the Museum of the City of New York. 
In a second historical comparison, he also likens himself to Mathew Brady, 
another celebrated photographer of his day who, with the express blessing of 
the Lincoln administration, famously gained access to photograph the Union 
encampments and battlefields of the American Civil War. This comparison 
is, for Meyerowitz, seemingly based upon a notion of the photographer’s 
responsibility to record catastrophic national events and to both shape and 
safeguard ‘public memory’.79
In 1985, Alan Trachtenberg called the American Civil War ‘the first significant 
crisis in modern history to occur within the memorializing gaze of a camera’, 
writing that it represented, specifically in Brady’s work, the first case of widely 
accepted ‘historicism-by-photography, [the] notion that historical knowledge 
declares its true value by its photographability’.80 This he also defines as the 
‘historicizing ideology’ of photography. It could be said, borrowing Trachtenberg’s 
words, that the September 11th attacks were the first significant crisis in modern 
history to occur for the memorializing gaze of the camera, and that its inherent 
and intentional photographability gave it more power than would otherwise have 
been imaginable. Along with many others who photographed the event and its 
aftermath, Meyerowitz expresses a belief in the ‘historicizing-by-photography’ 
that Trachtenberg attributes to photographers and audiences of the nineteenth 
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century, showing that this acceptance of photography’s role in the shaping of 
public memory has almost as long a history as photography itself. His efforts to 
win access and his subsequent toiling for nine months to create an archive that he 
saw as his national duty fit Meyerowitz, like Brady before him, into what might 
be called an American tradition of the national hero photographer. Journalism 
has long required the creation of star witnesses: brave, skilled and privileged in 
their access to conflict and catastrophe, whether promoted by the patronage of 
figures in authority, or (even better) working alone as unilateral renegades in 
pursuit of the truth. With comparable status to those engaged in combat or rescue 
operations, but on a uniquely reified level, these photographers are immersed in 
the action, and yet transcend it. As specialized witnesses, they are endowed not 
only with bravery but with the prestigious autonomy of the artist. LIFE magazine’s 
commemorative book, titled One Nation: America Remembers September 11, 2001, 
compiling highlights of its own coverage of the period following September 11th, 
features a ten-page section devoted to James Nachtwey, one such celebrated figure. 
Nachtwey is well known as a war photographer, and the LIFE profile shows how 
this almost mythic prestige was transferred onto the task of photographing the 
2001 attacks:
You might say that he travels the globe as a professional photographer  – 
perhaps the world’s preeminent chronicler of war – but Nachtwey feels 
he goes as a witness … So he’s never home, but he is always in the right 
place at the right time to record eerily beautiful images of violence and 
injustice … Nachtwey is regularly moved by what he sees, but while he lets 
emotion dictate which scene might be effective – which picture is most 
worth taking – he never lets it disrupt the task in hand. He worked through 
the day until it was dark, at times dodging debris, constantly piecing together 
the story.81
Again, the photographer is a warrior in a war zone. And again, this star status 
seems to come with a view, not least in the photographer’s own mind, of his work 
as having real national significance for posterity. Confirming Trachtenberg’s 
remarks about the accepted historicizing value of photography, Nachtwey 
reminisces that ‘I started to think the pictures would serve to document a crucial 
historical watershed’.82
In times of particular crisis, it seems that the association of photography with 
courageous action does not apply only to privileged ‘hero photographers’, it was 
also a startlingly automatic one for ordinary members of the public caught up 
in the attack on the World Trade Center. In numerous eyewitness accounts, 
running to the scene with a camera was described in the same terms as running 
there with a first-aid kit or a shovel. One contributor to the September 11 Photo 
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Project, an exhibition of vernacular photographic memorials staged in Manhattan 
shortly after the attacks, recalls his immediate reaction to news: ‘rather than watch 
from the safety of my window, I grabbed my camera and headed to the street’.83 
Another writes, ‘I am a nurse and I knew I had to go there. I rollerbladed four 
miles downtown to the WTC with my medical kit and camera.’84 Meyerowitz 
himself, whose photographic project carried the same sense of urgency as these 
amateur photographers but with the added weight of his official sanction and his 
pre-existing creative eminence, says of his project:
It is a privilege to work at Ground Zero. Everyone who works there has been 
transformed by the spirituality of the place. The camaraderie among the workers 
in the zone reminds me of the stories we’ve heard about the World Wars, where 
men and women are thrown together by a common cause, share tragedies and 
victories, and are forever bound to one another by their effort.85
Again, taking pictures is equated naturally with helping in the rescue effort. 
A publicity portrait taken by Timothy Greenfield-Sanders shows Meyerowitz 
in the midst of ‘the zone’, looking intently at the viewer, holding his huge 
mahogany box camera and folded tripod casually over his shoulder in the same 
manner as a clean-up worker might sling his shovel on a break from digging 
(or a soldier his rifle). Heroism, and specifically the comparison with warfare, 
became a standard way of valorizing not just the military action that followed 
the attacks, but the very work of cleaning up the rubble. Here, the photographer 
claims this same mantle of military heroism for himself, elevating it even further 
by virtue of his artistic gift, his sophisticated photographic paraphernalia and 
his patriotic rhetoric.
An obvious difference between Mathew Brady’s record and Meyerowitz’s is that, 
unlike Aftermath, in Brady’s photographs (most of which were actually taken by a 
team of lesser-known photographers under Brady’s direction, including Timothy 
H. O’Sullivan) we are confronted with visible human remains, most famously 
in an image of the fallen at Gettysburg which came to be titled, ‘A Harvest of 
Death’ (Figure 1.6). Despite claims in the exhibition’s companion publication that 
Meyerowitz’s collection of photographs illustrates the event’s human dimensions, 
the only direct acknowledgement of the loss of life is a single picture captioned, 
‘Bringing Out the Dead’: a floodlit nocturnal scene in which a group of workers 
carry some recovered remains, the only visible sign of which is a corner of the 
flag in which they are draped. The rest is darkness. Almost every photograph is 
centred around firefighters, rescue workers and the ethereal ruins of the destroyed 
twin towers. Whereas in Meyerowitz’s photographs there is only architectural 
destruction to signify loss of life, Brady shows the aftermath of battle in open fields 
where there was no falling rubble to obscure the dead. On seeing these photographs 
in 1863, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote of an impulse to ‘bury them in the recesses 
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figure 1.6 ‘Incidents of the War. A Harvest of Death’, Gettysburg, July 1863. 
Photo by Timothy H. O’Sullivan. Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs 
Division, Civil War Photographs [LC-B8184-7964-A].
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of our cabinet as we would have buried the mutilated remains of the dead they 
too visibly represented’.86 Burying is an important concept here. In his Camera 
Lucida, Roland Barthes examines the modern Western tendency to bury death and 
quickly hide it from consciousness by hiding it from view.87 Perhaps if the bodies 
of September 11th victims had been made visible to the public, the response would 
have been similarly to ‘bury’ and banish them instead of holding the photographic 
record in such prominence. Seemingly much less squeamish than modern 
audiences, viewers flocked to see Brady’s pictures of human destruction and paid 
money for them. However grim, the corpses in these photographs remained easier 
to confront than slavery, the primary cause of the conflict that was behind them. 
Again, parallels can be drawn with the truths effaced by celebrated photographs 
of September 11th. The notion that America’s own foreign policies, particularly in 
the Middle East, might, however indirectly, have led to this destruction is much 
more complicated and unattractive than Meyerowitz’s magnificent account. One 
reviewer of Aftermath writes:
Meyerowitz doesn’t resort to the heart wrenching, the lachrymose, the 
obvious, the stuff of Eyewitness News … Both the pictures and the text are 
understated, avoiding too the mawkish sentimentality that has come to 
define our collective public recollection of the fall and its physical and emotional 
aftermath … Thankfully, Meyerowitz’s purpose bears none of the shameless 
opportunism of politicians, the tabloids and local TV news. None of what 
novelist Philip Roth controversially called the ‘kitschification of 3,000 peoples’ 
deaths.’ You’ll find no hero worship in Aftermath, though there are plenty of 
heroes present.88
As an accomplished landscape photographer, Meyerowitz succeeds in 
making the collapsed towers appear as ancient ruins, monumental in scale and 
significance. Of course, they also claim monumental characteristics in a different 
sense: the book’s promotional material describes the work as ‘an elegy to the 
thousands who lost their lives’.89 These are photographic monuments as well as 
monumental photographs. And as well as the epic depiction of space, Meyerowitz’s 
characteristic landscape style also has a bearing on the images’ capturing of 
time, which is well suited to their ideological inference. In a deeply critical 
indictment of the work, which he has no qualms about calling propaganda, Liam 
Kennedy has argued that the ‘gravitas’ of these images is achieved in part because 
Meyerowitz captures ‘extended moments rather than decisive moments’, which 
invites empathetic contemplation as the only response.90 This is not the frozen 
snapshot style that by necessity characterizes so many other photographs of the 
‘action’ of September 11th, but a controlled, stable depiction of the sustained 
passage of time in a single frame. There is no chaos here, no elusive meaning. 
Meaning appears stable, steady and easily grasped.
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Though framed as the only documentary record of the clean-up operation, 
the photographs have less in common with the American documentary tradition 
than they do with history painting, and specifically in several cases, scenes of the 
sublime drama of the sea. One image, ‘Welders in South Tower’ is a wide-angle 
nocturnal scene showing a small group of metalworkers amongst the very last 
standing remnants of the building. Rising above the horizon of the pit’s boundary 
the surrounding buildings are cast in deep black-blues and greens, against which 
the welders’ fire is tiny but brilliant. In many of his pictures, the photographer 
makes atmospheric use of rising smoke, steam or spray from fire-hoses. In this 
image, steam or smoke – it could be either – catches the light and picks out 
architectural details, both highlighting and obscuring, like a watercolour wash, 
or sea-spray. It creates a plane of its own amongst the other receding layers in the 
image, all of which are in perfect focus and redolent with textural detail. The human 
figures are somewhere in the middle distance, both dwarfed and anchored by the 
hot halo of their work, which seems to keep them from drowning in the expanse 
of twisted rubble that encroaches on them in dark waves. This picture above all 
evokes the shipwrecks, storms and naval battles of J.M.W. Turner, in which man 
struggles in noble contention with the sublime power of the elements.91 It makes 
sense that these photographs should find their historical reference point not in the 
fleeting here-and-now of documentary photography but the paintings of Turner 
and the Romantics: an art of transcendence, mythic hubris and eternal truths. 
Meyerowitz says that his goal ‘was not to make “pretty” pictures of the destruction 
but to record – with meticulous archival precision – what happened … it was not 
about making Art,’ though he does admit that many of the images ‘revealed an 
accidental beauty’.92 Some have dared to describe the act of terrorism at the World 
Trade Center as ‘the greatest work of art that is possible in the whole cosmos’ 
(Karlheinz Stockhausen), and the perpetrators as ‘brilliant’ (Norman Mailer) and 
‘death artists’ (Jonathan Franzen).93 After the spectacle of the attack had passed, 
the site was not beautiful. It was a mass graveyard. Many images of the area, made 
by professional photographers like Gilles Peress and Susan Meiselas, as well as the 
majesterial ruins of Joel Meyerowitz, are formally beautiful, though it has seemed 
sacrilegious to say so (and so they are called surreal). The photographic artistry 
that can transform the horrific and the unseeable in these scenes is part of the 
commercial appeal of commemorative publications like Aftermath and LIFE’s 
One Nation book.
The After September 11 exhibition was presented as a kind of corrective, 
intended to reveal to audiences around the world the unmediated reality of what 
Americans had been through, and the accompanying catalogue publication 
seemed designed to instruct audiences in how to react. Alongside reproductions 
of Meyerowitz’s photographs, the catalogue features many images of people, 
including some who had participated in the clean-up, looking at the exhibition at 
its various locations, contemplating the pictures alone or in groups. In the same 
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vein as photographs of politicians surveying the scene itself, this seems to be a 
paternalistic lesson in how to look. Though not strictly what Adorno had in mind, 
here is the culture industry’s infantilizing agenda: a symbolic intervention in the 
processes of witnessing and understanding. But, the overriding problem with this 
exhibition was much more urgent than the question of how much visual trauma 
viewers could tolerate, or exactly what they saw. At its launch event, the secretary 
of state made a speech that betrayed a startling leap from the grief invoked by these 
photographs, to military retaliation:
September eleventh was a very personal experience for each of us. Each of 
us remembers where we were when we first learned of the attacks. Each of us 
remembers our initial chilling impressions and our response. These images 
remind me that our country, our people and our families are very precious and 
that we must do all we can to protect them from the scourge of terrorism … It 
gave us a sense of purpose and vision as a people, showed the world what 
Americans were made of, and gave us the opportunity to lead a worldwide 
coalition to go after not only the perpetrators of these attacks, but to go after 
terrorists around the world.94 (italics added)
In his address at the National Cathedral on 15 September 2001, President Bush 
made a similar link, telling the congregation, ‘our unity is a kinship of grief, and 
a steadfast resolve to prevail against our enemies. And this unity against terror is 
now extending across the world’.95 Again, the causal association between grief and 
militarism was taken to be a foregone conclusion. Like the photographs, it spoke 
for itself. The text of the president’s National Cathedral address was reproduced 
in the After September 11 exhibition catalogue, further cementing the connection 
between these pictures and war. Identifying Meyerowitz’s work as the archetype 
of what he calls ‘late photography’, David Campany has argued that such images, 
as well as being ideal vehicles for mass mourning, can foster ‘political withdrawal’ 
precisely because of their profound stillness and silence. The dangerous truism 
that such imagery speaks for itself can, he says, ‘easily flatter the ideological 
paralysis of those who gaze at it with a lack of social or political will to make sense 
of its circumstance’.96 Meyerowitz’s photographs were part of a state apparatus 
that capitalized on this ideological paralysis, and that had the power not only 
to cement whatever meanings it chose to invest in them, but to underwrite the 
authority of these meanings and promote them around the world.
The American media’s presentation of September 11th can at best be called 
incomplete in its abundance. While a good deal of writing, discussion and debate 
did take place in the aftermath of this event, its overwhelming presentation was 
visual, and specifically photographic, amounting to a spectacle of such force that 
it paralysed critical dissent. In Adornian terms, this enforced regressive seeing 
was paradoxically entrenched by the autonomy of the press and the impression 
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of total, unimpeded visibility. Public engagement was swept aside by ‘public 
memory’, and the dazzled, grieving American people forfeited the ability to 
see, beyond their own borders and the present moment, the deaths to come. As 
well as in the loss of human life and the material destruction, this attack was a 
spectacular blow to America within the symbolic economy of spectacle on which 
the state itself is based. America’s leaders knew better than anyone that such an 
act of image-engineering was itself a piece of statecraft and a devastating political 
blow. As the Retort group argues, when an image-based state is defeated in the 
image-world as America was, it is obliged to come up with an answer. And so, the 
US media struggled, using all the redemptive narratives, emotive plotlines and 
visual cues at its disposal to try to manage the fallout of its symbolic defeat. Years 
later, the state is still ‘flailing blindly in the face of an image it cannot exorcize, 
and trying desperately to convert the defeat back into terms it can respond to’.97 
The primary location for this attempted symbolic riposte has been Iraq. But, not 
only was that campaign a disaster in conventional military terms, it has also, 
despite the construction of triumphal photo opportunities (the fall of Saddam’s 
statue and Bush’s flight-deck victory declaration coming most obviously to mind, 
both of which were of course countered by the far greater impact of ‘the Abu 
Ghraib photographs’), failed to produce a vision that could reassert America’s 
status in the economy of images. Further, the endless repetition, within its own 
media machine, of the defeat itself has not only had the effect of undermining the 
psychological recovery of its population as I will go on to argue, but also of simply 
reiterating the crushing point again and again. In Retort’s words, ‘where, in the 
end, is the image the war machine has been looking for – the one to put paid to 
the September haunting? … The Towers keep falling.’98
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